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Wilkins: Book Review
REVIEW
BOOK
LAWSUIT:

By Stuart M. Speiser*

New York: Horizon Press, 1980. 617 pp.
Reviewed by Lawrence P. Wilkinst
Like Shakespeare's man, a lawsuit has seven agespleadings, pretrial procedures, pre-trial conferences,
trial, post-trial procedures, final judgment, and appeal.'

T

of a lawsuit are portrayed in new light through the lively
prose of Mr. Speiser, as he tells the backstage stories in seven major
tort cases in which he or members of his firm have participated during his
distinguished career.' More than just chronicled events observable by
anyone, the author's stories reveal some of the thinking processes which
turn the seven ages of a lawsuit into working tools in the resolution of
controversies. More than just another collection of "stories-about-cases-theauthor-has-won," the book is a discourse on the author's thesis that the
American "trinity of torts" (jury trial, contingent fees, and entrepreneurlawyers)' provides the best method of redressing the grievances of injured
tort victims that the world's legal systems have to offer. Mr. Speiser uses
his seven major cases as illustrations of how the person injured by the torts
of corporate giants can make those giants answerable for their wrongdoings
upon an equal footing with the individual victim, who would be no match
for the economic and political power of the giants without the unique
features of the American tort system. He utilizes those cases further as
springboards for historical and comparative analysis, relating other illustrative cases, to demonstrate how the American tort system functions today,
HE SEVEN AGES

*Member of the law firm of Speiser, Krause & Madole, with offices in New York, Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and London.
tAssociate Professor of Law, Indiana University Law School-Indianapolis.
'F. Griffin, Jr., PreparingBriefs that Win Cases in COMPLETE GUmE TO A PROFITABLE LAW
PRACTICE 251. (Prentice-Hall ed. 1965). The reference is to Shakespeare's As You Like
It, Act II, Scene VII, Jaques' lines that begin, "All the world's a stage ...
"
2

The major cases, in the order in which they appear in the book, are Nader v. General
Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970); McClenny v.
United Air Lines, 178, F. Supp. 372 (W.D. Mo. 1959); Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82
(Fla. App. 1959); Krause v. Sud-Aviation, Societe Nationale de Constructions Aeronautiques,
413 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 1969); Clemente v. United States, 422 F. Supp. 564 (D.P.R. 1976),
rev'd, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975); a case for which the
author supplies no citation which arose out of the aviation disaster involving a collision
between a Pan American Airways Boeing 747 and a KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Boeing
747 at Tenerife Airport in the Canary Islands on March 27, 1977. Several other cases
(some of them major cases in their own right) are woven into the author's stories, but the
cases above provide the framework for the book.
8
SPEISER, LAwsurr 120 (1980) [hereinafter cited as LAwsuTr].
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and to show how those functions have evolved. Indeed, as the publisher's
press release has claimed, the book engulfs the reader in a "living history
of tort litigation," as told by a participant in an epoch of the system's
evolution.
In easy, flowing narrative, illustrated by excerpts from the transcripts
and court opinions, Mr. Speiser reveals counsels' strategy and techniques
for remedying plaintiff's injuries, some of which work to their desired end,
others of which do not. Since the book was obviously written for the lay
reader,' the use of trial transcripts and written court opinions was risky,
holding the potential for turning away the reader with no penchant for
the usually dry, tedious and narrowly focused courtroom exchanges of
attorneys and witnesses and the usually technical language of court opinions.
The author has selected the excerpts well, however, and most are very
interesting, illustrative, and complementary to the style of the book.' The
excerpts, and the manner in which they are presented, are indispensable in

giving life to this "living history."
Generously spiced with the author's personal anecdotes, these stories
emanating from the aftermath of human catastrophe are as alive with the
humor and spirit of mankind as with the physical and mental suffering
that must be portrayed by plaintiffs' tort lawyers. In his sometimes flattering,
sometimes criticizing, sometimes tongue-in-cheek, but always respectful,
accounts of professional colleagues, whether cohort, opponent or judge,
Mr. Speiser permits the reader to meet the actors in his dramas about
revolutions in the law of torts. Clients and their families, law partners,
investigators, lay and expert witnesses, bureaucrats, legislators, judges,
4

The author goes to too much effort to describe and explain fundamental legal concepts
for the work to have been aimed at a readership of lawyers. At the same time, he eschews too much in-depth analysis of the impact and ramifications of most of these
concepts in relation to the legal issues being related in the story for the work to have
been written as a primary source for law students. See, e.g., LAwsrr, supra note 3, at 31,
where the possibility of a defamation suit by Ralph Nader against General Motors is
considered; at 194, where the concept of defendants undertaking to act in the plaintiff's
interest where no preexisting duty can be asserted is briefly mentioned; at 259, where
the problem of workers' compensation benefits as an exclusive remedy arises; and, at
444, where a particularly innovative use of a motion for summary judgment is briefly related, in contrast to the devotion of nearly three pages to simply printing the table of
contents of that motion.
5Since the technique of permitting the participants of the stories to speak directly through
the excerpts is such an important and highly successful stylistic technique of the author's,
he should not be criticized for the very large ratio of indented material to narrative.
There are some notable exceptions, however, where the excerpts could have been encapsuled by the author and the space gained thereby devoted to thoughts by the author.
See, e.g., LAwsurr, supra note 3, at 258, an excerpt from a pre-trial order of United States
District Court Judge Albert A. Ridge; at chapter 6, several excerpts from court opinions
in the Clemente case. On the other hand, some illustrative excerpts that were not provided
would have added to the value of the technique. For example, at page 519, a defense tactic
in a damages trial in which the point of contention was the discount rate for reducing
the award to present value would have been more clearly understood by the reader if
another excerpt showing the defense attorney's attempt to establish a higher rate had
been provided.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/6
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defense counsel, jurors, pilots, and air traffic controllers are all real people
in this book, and the author does so well in acquainting the reader with
many of these people that to finish reading the book fills the reader with
the feelings of sadness and disappointment one usually experiences in leaving
new friends without the prospect of meeting them again and learning more
about them. Viewed in this light, the book is a significant new contribution
to the literature of and about law which explores the human dimensions of
litigation.
In his book, Persons and Masks of the Law, Professor John T. Noonan,
Jr. objects to the tendency of lawyers, judges, law professors and historians
to write about abstractions in the law as if those abstractions are animate,
sentient beings independent of the living human beings engaged in the legal
process. Critical of this personification (he says impersonation would be
more accurate) of legal rules and the overwhelming emphasis upon analysis
and critiscism of those legal rules as distinct from the humanity of the
participants he writes:
The historians of law have not provided a counter-balance to the
analytical approach. They have been generally lawyers themselves,
affected by professional education and outlook. Few in number, they
have been isolated in schools devoted to training practitioners. They
have written the life of doctrines. The best American work in legal
history, that of James Willard Hurst, has been the careful investigation
of the interplay between economic forces and the legal rules. Like
the sociological jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound, it is by no means
exclusively centered on rules: the interests of human beings are seen
as affecting the results. But it is characteristic of Hurst's focus that
in a book entitled The Growth of American Law: The Lawmakers, he
speaks of lawyers, legislators, and judges as "the principal agencies of
law"; the individuals have become instruments. For the purpose of
assessing the personal responsibility of the judges, legislators, and lawyers, this species of social history, like Pound's jurisprudence, is insufficiently attentive to persons. The classic model is still The Common
Law.'
Mr. Speiser's history rises to Professor Noonan's implicit challenge and
meets it well. It might be said that one could hardly avoid some commentary
on the real people behind the file numbers when one is recounting the
representation of the likes of Ralph Nader or Vera Zabala Clemente (Roberto Clemente's widow), or describing the peculiar difficulties of suing the
estate of an Aristotle Onassis, and so Mr. Speiser's history is no better than
any other literary attempt to exploit the fame of people one has known.
Such a criticism of this book would be unwarranted and unfair; the humanity
of the luminary personalities grace the pages of Lawsuit to be sure, but the
greater significance of the work is its attention to the humamity of the
0 J. NOONAN,
PERsoNs AND MASKS
Published
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"ordinary" participants in the process. In a segment of the chapter "Worldwide Effects of American Tort Law," entitled "Enter: Judge Peirson M.
Hall," for example, the reader meets the eighty-year-old "clean-shaven
Santa Claus" of a judge who worked his way from a South Dakota orphanage through a career on the federal bench that spanned thirty-seven
years. The intellectual prowess of Judge Hall is humorously described by
the author as he relates how the judge applied his own innovative legal
theory to a difficult multi-district litigation problem arising out of the Turkish
Airlines DC-10 Paris air crash of 1974, an innovation that apparently escaped the thinking of some of the preeminent aviation tort lawyers in the
world until the judge announced it in his opinion.' Judge Hall's physical
heroics become apparent to the reader in the author's poignant account
of how the judge "shap[ed] an unmanageable case into a triumph of justice
by the force of his will and intellect"' despite the ravages of cancer and
heart disease.
If Judge Hall was too prominent a human being to save Mr. Speiser
from the hypothetical criticism of exploiting one's great and near great
acquaintences, consider his sensitive stories of a carpenter crippled in an
aircraft collision in Florida,' a fourteen-year-old boy who was holding a rifle
when it discharged into his father's back because of a manufacturing design
defect,1" a commercial pilot wrongfully accused of killing Aristotle Onassis'
son," and the husband and four sons of an Oregon woman who was killed
in the Tenerife Airport collision of two jumbo jets."2
All this is not to say, however, that Mr. Speiser is beyond criticism.
All too often he is content to supply only sketchy biographical information
about some lawyers who are important players in his dramas. This tendency
is noticeable perhaps because he so vividly describes the personalities and
proclivities of some of the lawyer-players while supplying only the curriculum
vita of others. For example, the reader is treated to warm recollections of
an irascible, cynical, bachelor, old-style tort lawyer nicknamed "Battling
Billy Hyman" who viewed litigation as a "deadly game,"13 and whose approach to pre-trial discovery influenced the author profoundly in the early
7 See LAwsurr, supra note 3, at 454-60, where the judge synthesizes federal admiralty law

and state
portunity
to obtain
involving

law governing damages in wrongful death actions to afford plaintiffs the opto obtain relief for loss of love and affection, a result the author had attempted
by asking a California judge in a California court in a lawsuit filed in California
California defendants to apply French law for the benefit of British plaintiffs.

BLAWSUIT, supra note 3, at 468.
9Id. chapter 4.
2id. chapter 5.
-1/d. chapter 7.
12 Id. chapter 8. Indeed, the author's respect for the humanity of his clients leads him

to either treat them anonymously or fictionalize their names in spite of the fact that their
identities can be obtained, in most instances, -from -public case reports. •.
13 Id. at 185.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/6
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stages of his career. Compared to that background story, the author's rendition of the story of Charles Krause, who has been with Mr. Speiser's law
firm since 1959, is extremely sparse. " Mr. Krause appears frequently and extensively in the book, since the author describes several trials that his
partner conducts. The reader becomes quite familiar with Mr. Krause
qua trial tactician, but never really gets a sense of who Chuck Krause is, or
the significance of Chuck Krause's personal human traits in doing law.
It would have been appropriate for Mr. Speiser to have included more of
Chuck Krause, the human being, in the chapter entitled "Tort Lawyers
of the 1980's." Several other lawyers are given similar treatment in the
book; many more are merely listed by name and residence. While the author's
desire to fraternally acknowledge as many associates, colleagues, and opponents as possible is understandable, the placement of these "honorable
mentions" in an acknowledgment section would have been just as effective.
Given the author's general approach, which makes real people such
an important feature of the book, one comment about the relationship of
clients and attorneys is disturbing. In his discussion of the importance of
specialists in delivering legal services in the age of the entrepreneur-lawyer,
he tries to establish that the injured person should rely more upon the
personal attorney in general practice for counseling rather than the tort
specialist whom the personal attorney calls in on the case:
Compared to the personal attention they get from a large general
practice firm-whom they pay by the hour-they may feel that their
treatment in a busy tort specialist's office is brusque. We try to avoid
this, but it is sometimes inevitable. Tort practice is more oriented.
toward dealing with judges, jurors, insurance adjusters, and defense
lawyers than toward the personal counseling of clients. Often the senior
members of specialist firms are busy in court or traveling on depositions
and do not have much time available for client counseling. During
the preparatory stages of the case, the client's contacts are often with
junior lawyers, who may not inspire as much confidence in the client
as the familiar counselors at the general practice firm. 15
It may be supposed that in a busy world, brusque treatment is sometimes
inevitable. Still, when it occurs in the relationship of service professional
to client, one must wonder if a change in thinking about the orientation of
the practice might, at the very least, reduce the number of unsatisfactory
contacts. There can be no denial that litigation specialists must spend the
bulk of their time dealing with judges, jurors, insurance adjusters, witnesses,
and opposing counsel. But the reason for those dealings is the client. The
person perhaps least able to take brusque treatment in stride is the person
suffering from physical and emotional trauma inflicted by the wrongful
14 See id. at 310.
251d. by
atIdeaExchange@UAkron,
576 [emphasis supplied].
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conduct of others. Often, the client's first contact with the legal profession
occurs when the person seeks a remedy for tortious injuries. The client may
be no more familiar with the general practice attorneys that first confer with
the client than the specialists. General practice firms too are busy, and may be
spending the largest proportion of their time dealing with judges, jurors, insurance adjusters, witnesses and opposing counsel. To assume that the general
practice firm is more able or even more willing to provide personal client counseling will permit some clients to "fall through the cracks" in the counseling
function. If the thinking is adopted that tort practice is oriented toward the
client and is an extension of the client in dealing with other people necessary to
vindicate the client's interests, maybe the inevitability of brusque treatment can
be reduced or eliminated. It would seem that the tort specialist firm would in
fact be better able to perform the vital function of client counseling than the
general practice firm, since, by nature of the practice such a firm would
be more educated and experienced in the particular physical, emotional,
and informational needs of injured plaintiffs. So too, the direct involvement
of the specialist firm with what is happening with the client's claim would
suggest the specialists as the best source for information and guidance. We
are all familiar with the tendency for messages to become distorted in the
process of human communication. If the tort specialist-the person with
the best information and experience with the needs of torts clients-assumes
the general practitioner has primary responsibility for client counseling,
much of the value of the specialist to the client is lost, despite the best of
efforts to communicate through the general practitioner."6 The quoted statement by the author is out of step with the generally humanistic tone of
the book.
Keenly focused upon the objectives of developing, documenting, and
justifying the concept of the entrepreneur-lawyer, the author presents his
thesis very well. As if viewing a large segment of the American public
as a jury being asked to reach a verdict about tort lawyers, he presents
his case in opposition to critic-adversaries who would have the public
believe such lawyers to be "fat cats, privateers, or bounty hunters."'" He
26 The author briefly described one specialists' firm's approach to the problem at page 297.

The approach might be characterized as a specialty within a specialty; it utilizes an "interviewing attorney" whose sole function is to relieve trial attorneys from the detail of
client contact. The author, sensitive to the potential for impersonal, assembly-line treatment
that such an approach holds, asserts warmth, enthusiasm, and teamwork as reasons why
the firm described did not fall into that trap. The obvious essential qualities of such a
system are warmth, enthusiasm, and teamwork. If those qualities are maintained, there is
no reason to assume that a general practice firm working with the specialists' firm could
not adequately perform client interviewing and counseling functions. The problems begin
when it is assumed that these qualities are extant as the client becomes involved with more
than one firm and several attorneys.
17
The quote comes from an article in The National Law Journal in the author's regular
Tort Law column, where he incapsulates his thesis. Speiser, How the Entrepreneur-Lawyer
Changed the Rules ol the Game, National Law Journal, Dec. 1, 1980 at. 48, col. 4. See
-

also LAwsurr, supra note 3, at 594.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/6
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opens his presentation with the case of Nader v. General Motors Corp." as
his first "exhibit," carefully developing the background and details of the
lawsuit in which Mr. Nader sought recovery against General Motors for
invasion of privacy, alleging that the company had used intrusive tactics
to counteract his anti-Corvair-pro-automobile-safety campaign launched in
the mid-sixties. Revealing the theories and tactics employed by plaintiffs
counsel, Mr. Speiser demonstrates for the reader-jury how this "David v.
0 lawsuit eventually vindicated
Goliath""
Mr. Nader's interests.2" Then, by
way of contrast, he presents opinion evidence from lawyers, judges and
legal analysts from other countries to support the inference he would have
the "jury" draw-that the favorable result could not have been reached
anywhere else but in the American legal system.
Proceeding further into his "case-in-chief," Mr. Speiser then develops
his notion of revolutionary change in the American legal system itself
through historical evidence in a chapter entitled "The Early American
Tort Lawyer: Colonial Times to 1950." In this chapter he presents the
case histories of the SS Eastland, a ship sinking in which 1,100 people
drowned, the General Slocum, a ship fire where 1,021 passengers (mostly
women and children) died while the ship's captain and crew escaped, the
Titanic disaster that killed 1,517 people, the Iroquois Theater fire that incinerated 602 Chicago theater-goers who had come to see the British
musical hit "Mr. Blue Beard," and the Triangle Shirtwaist factory fire in
New York City that resulted in 145 employees' deaths. Documenting the
shocking results in all of these cases in attempts to obtain legal redress by
families of the victims, Mr. Speiser sets the stage for his rendition of revolutions in tort practice as engineered by the twentieth-century entrepreneurlawyers. Then, in following chapters, he traces the development of the
scientific and business-management oriented tort specialist, who, using the
contingent fee agreement as security for the necessarily huge investments
of capital, time and effort to litigate such claims, equalizes the disparate
economic and political powers of innocent injured individuals and culpable corporate giants. In these chapters, he carefully marshals his evidence
(including his own involvement in revolutionary aviation tort litigation)
to orient it in the direction of answering the question of why it is only in
18 LAWSUIT,

supra note 3, ch. 1; see Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255

N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970).
10LAWSUIT, supra note 3, at 110.
20 Since the book is addressed to the lay-reader, the author patiently and effectively intro-

duces the reader to an enormous amount of legal lore and technicality. In the first chapter,
for example, the reader is exposed to a definition of tort; an exposition of the common
law system; an introduction to the law of defamation, privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and interference with economic advantage; a discussion of conflicts of
law; the concept of diversity of citizenship; the intellectual challenges of attempting to
persuade a trial judge to embrace a new theory of law; the synthesizing process of
analyzing common law decisions not directly- on -point to the'case at hand; an application
to the
attorney-client privilege;
Published
by IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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America that tort plaintiffs can meet corporate defendants eye-to-eye in
the legal forum. Finally, putting himself on the "witness-stand," he responds
to pointed questions about the American legal system and profession in
general, tort claims practice and himself in particular, and inter-related
topics in a chapter called "Interview With a Tort Lawyer."
In this adversarial mode of presenting his ideas, Mr. Speiser perhaps
opens himself up to criticism that the work is too one-sided. But, after all,
he is trying to counter what he considers to be "bad press," and wishes
to present an image of the tort lawyer sharply delineated and contrasted
with the "fat cat, privateer, or bounty hunter" image. He sets himself to
the task of not merely describing a system for a reader-jury, leaving them
completely free to draw their own conclusions, but of proving that the
system permits greater access by aggrieved persons and deters anti-social
conduct by corporate entities. However, in several respects, a more balanced or complete presentation would have added measurably to the value
of the book, contributing to a more precise perception of the tort compensation system without detracting from his thesis or objective.
One such area deserving more focused attention is the limitations of
the entrepreneur-lawyer system in the "battle" of tort victims versus corporate giants. In many segments of the book, the author does acknowledge
the fact that it is only the seriously injured claimant who stands a good
chance of recovery against the defendant who has the resources available
to employ high calibre lawyers and attrition tactics toward the lawsuit.21
In many other segments, however, his statements create the impression
that the system is open to a larger number of injured people than it actually
is, that it is available and effective for persons with less than "serious"
22
injury.
The reason for this limitation on the system is implicit in the nature
of two elements of the author's "trinity of torts" and their interaction: the
contingent fee arrangement and the entrepreneurial approach to lawyering.
The author discusses the interaction in a section of the chapter on "The
Scientific Tort Lawyer" called "The Money Dynamics of Tort Litigation."
There he makes the point that the key to the success of modem tort compensation systems is the willingness and ability of tort specialists to invest
their own money in pursuing the plaintiff's claim. He points out that it is
not unusual for attorneys to "lay out six-figure sums for processing a single
case."2 3 In addition, he, establishes very. graphically the high costs of assembling and maintaining the facilities and personnel of a specialist firm
necessary to mobilize at a moment's notice against economically and
See, e.g., LAWSUIT, supra note 3, at 262, 269, 299, 587, 593-94, 597.
See, e.g., id. at 110,. 120, 137, 151, 588-89, 595.
23 Id.at 560.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/6
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politically powerful defendants and to sustain the pressure of litigation in
the client's behalf. The prospect of a large fee of course makes the tort
lawyer willing to make these investments, but the usual tort plaintiff has
nowhere near the level of capital that could absorb fees to cover sixfigure expenses plus overhead and profit margin. The contingent fee arrangement closes the gap, permitting tort specialists to proceed on the
claim upon the hope that recovery in the lawsuit will enable the plaintiff
to pay the fees and expenses. Therein lies the limitation: against the risk
of a potential recovery ceiling of five figures, for example, it would be foolish
to invest six-figure sums to litigate. The money dynamics work in such
a way that the entrepreneur-lawyer must have some security for her investment. She may be willing to invest heavily in a claim, despite the
risk of zero return, where there is a substantial margin between the expenditure-overhead-profit margin level of the potential fee and the ceiling
of the potential recovery. In such a scheme, the injury of the client becomes
an asset which provides the security for the lawyer's investments in providing professional services. If the injury-asset of the plaintiff is not large
enough to attract the tort specialist's investment, the client must seek other
investors in the legal services market until he finds a lawyer willing to
supply the services at a lower level of investment. Assuming that a lawyer
can be attracted at all, by the author's own standards, this means the client
is receiving services of lesser quality. 4 This means that in a hypothetical
case where a defendant injures two plaintiffs by the same conduct but
produces a "serious" injury in one plaintiff and a "non-serious" injury in
the other, the former plaintiff is able to seek better legal services than
25
the latter. The author does not seem to be concerned to any great extent
about this anomolous feature of the system, and it would have been extremely interesting to read his thoughts as to how the anomoly can be reduced or eliminated. Mr. Speiser is concerned about gaps and anomolies
in the system, as evidenced by his treatment of many issues that arose in
his illustrative cases. That concern is further evidenced in direct comment
in discrete sections of the book." But this anomoly, which relates directly
to the nature, function and effectiveness of the entrepreneur-lawyer concept
that the author invested so much literary effort to develop, gets only incidental treatment. It would have improved the book if he had dispensed
with his vague and undeveloped proposal to assert handgun control through
products liability litigation,2 putting that off for a later, more thought-out
24

Quality in this sense, of course, relates to the economic ability to wage the legal battle

against the corporate giants. To assume that there is a necessary and positive correlation
between the economic liquidity of a lawyer and the quality of legal representation in the
senses of intellectual ability and technical competence is patently absurd.
25 In fairness to the author,' he does address thd proiblem directly in a piragraph at -page
577, but there he speaks very briefly and only descriptively.
6
2 -LAWSUIT, supra note 3, at 578-81; chapter. 9,..
......
....

27.Id.byatIdeaExchange@UAkron,
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work, and used the space for a more balanced analysis of the entrepreneurlawyer system.
A hypothetical to illustrate another aspect of the entrepreneur-lawyer
system given little attention 'by the author incidentally illustrates the
anomoly raised in the preceding paragraph: suppose two plaintiffs injured
by an explosion caused by the negligence of a single defendant, a large
corporation. Assume that both incur medical expenses of $500 and miss
five days of work valued at $250, that both recover from their physical
injuries and are able to return to their occupations without limitation of
their earnings potential. The only difference between the two plaintiffs is
in their injuries, which, under the operation of the entrepreneur-lawyer
system as described by the author, produces a wide disparity in their
ability to employ the most effective legal representation of their claims
against the corporate defendant. The first plaintiff is struck by debris from
the explosion, suffers a concussion, is rendered unconscious and experiences
little if any pain from the blow. The second plaintiff receives serious but nondisabling burns from the fire of the explosion, remains conscious, and although the shock from the burns actually blocks the pain for a time, he
later suffers excruciating pain. The difference in injury enables the second
plaintiff to add a greater element of pain and suffering to the claim than
the first plaintiff. The second plaintiff thereby has a more attractive injury-asset than the first to serve as security for the "loan" of legal services
of the nature provided by tort specialists' firms. It may be argued that of
course this is true because the injuries are not equal; the second plaintiff's
pain and suffering makes the invasion of interests by the defendant greater
and thereby more "deserving" of the greater chance for full and effective
legal representation. The argument most certainly begs the question, but
more importantly it is simplistic and naive about the function of the pain
and suffering element of damages.
The author professes an orientation in his approach to practicing
law toward the search for truth with an ever-vigilant eye toward the pragmatics of the circumstances of the case.2" It would have been refreshing
in a work of this nature to see him reveal the truths and pragmatics of
the pain and suffering element of damages in addition to his "how we do
it" treatment of the concept. The truth of the matter is that the second
hypothetical plaintiff's pain and suffering makes the claim attractive for
investment in the legal services market because it will supply the funds for
payment of the contingent fee. One pragmatic notion of the matter is
that the second plaintiff's claim permits the tort specialist to invest the
effort in presenting a "scientific" 29 argument to the jury that pain and
28

Id. at 560.

29

Despite the author's claim, and recognizing that experts in current medical science may

be called upon to testify in the pain and suffering aspects of a client's case, the per diem
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol14/iss3/6
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suffering should be measured by a per-diem method, knowing that the

jury is likely to take into account that a large award for pain and suffering
will permit the contingent fee to be paid without the fee eating into the
award for plaintiff's actual economic losses.30 Pragmatically, the primal fear
of fire and the widespread recognition of burn pain as particularly excruciating create the leverage necessary to overcome the usual reluctance

of insurance adjusters to put any value upon pain and suffering for purposes
of settlement. The adjuster knows that prayers for pain and suffering are
argument, per se, is not scientific. For the commonly expressed objections to the technique on
the grounds that it lends an artificial appearance of precision to a measurement that is
at best imprecise and that it produces "an illusion of certainty by evidence," see Duguay
v. Gelinas, 104 N.H. 182, 182 A.2d 451 (1962). For an analysis of pain and suffering
awards in the light of recent scientific observations that challenges the propriety of that
element of damages, see Peck, Compensation for Pain: A Reappraisal in Light of New
Medical Evidence, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1974). For a favorable view of the per diem
argument technique, see Comment, The Unit of Time Method of Computing Pain and Suffering as Portrayed on Blackboards and Charts, 3 MmSH. J. PRAc. & Pioc. 422 (1970).
so This of course assumes that the per diem argument can be made to the jury. Depending
upon the jurisdiction, that may not be possible. The judicial trend may be to permit the
argument, but currently the states are roughly equally divided into three categories; those
that permit it, those that deny it, and those that permit it or deny it at the discretion of
the trial judge. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1347 (1958) and supplemental updates. Indeed,
the matter is not even as settled in Florida as the author implies at page 295 of the book.
The case of Ratner v. Arrington, 111 So.2d 82 (Fla. App. 1959), which is the basis for
the author's story in chapter 4 is, after all only a Florida Court of Appeals decision and
only two other districts have explicitly followed it: Perdue v. Watson, 144 So.2d 840
(Fla. App. 1962) and Payne v. Alvarez, 156 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1963). All three of
these decisions leave the matter to the discretion of the trial judge. Further, there remains
the cloud of language in a Florida Supreme Court decision that has not been completely
removed. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 80 So.2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955), contains the statement: 'Their problem [the jury's problem of equating the nature of pain,
embarrassment, and inconvenience with money] is not of mathematical calculation but
involves an exercise of their sound judgment of what is fair and right." The case involved
the issue of whether awards for future pain and suffering should be reduced to present
value. The court expressly declined to pass upon the question of the propriety of the per
diem argument with language that indicated it approved leaving it within the trial court's
discretion. Furthermore, one might conclude that the long standing of the court of appeals
decisions removes the cloud of the quoted language. However, as demonstrated by the
author, the machinery of justice in the tort compensation system sometimes works very
slowly, and the potential for definitive Florida Supreme Court treatment of the issue still
exists.
It is appropriate here to raise another criticism of the author's approach to the book.
As stated previously, the press release for the work asserted a utility for law students to
learn things "not revealed in the classroom." Horizon Press News Release at 3. One tool
that is supplied in the law school classroom is citation to authority for the assertions being
made. The author asserts that the Ratner v. Arrington decision was a landmark decision,
which it may well be, but he does not even bother to give its name or cite for law student
readers. He omits to do the same with quotations, excerpts, and paraphrases of various
legal authority with maddening frequency. He is critical of a generalized and abstract group
of "well meaning law professors" who are critical of some features of the torts compensation system that obviously have served him and his clients very well. But my guess is
that those law professors (whoever they might be) would cite to the authorities upon
which they rely for their assertions so that the reader can test those assertions for himself.
It may be true that the lay reader would have no interest in conducting such research, but
the book has been promoted for use by law students, and the author's proposals for law
reform almost certainly were intended for consideration by lawyers and legal scholars as
well. His frequent omissions of citations extremely limit the utility and credibility of the
book.by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1981
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the tort lawyer's usual method of "self-liquidating"31 the contingent fee
in the lawsuit and will negotiate vigorously to discount it or disallow it altogether with the argument that the insurer is not in the business of paying
plaintiff's attorneys fees. But the adjuster also knows that if plaintiff can
get the case to the jury on damages, the pain and suffering element enhances
the potential verdict. In a strong case on liability, the settlement value of
the second hypothetical plaintiff's case goes up considerably more than
that of the first plaintiff, even if the hypothetical is modified to produce
conscious pain and suffering by the first plaintiff. The revolution in tort
practice described by the author has opened up the courts to some individual
plaintiffs and has enabled them to hold the corporate giants accountable
for their conduct upon equal terms. It will take a revolution in tort law,
such as the recoverability of attorney fees as tort damages, to put injured
people like the first plaintiff in the hypothetical upon similar footing. An
exploration by the author of the merits of such a proposal, coming from
one who has been involved in a tort practice spanning four decades, would
have been interesting and influential to the bench, bar, client, and classroom segments of the legal system.
One final aspect of the litigation process neglected by the author deserves notice. After building the drama of the Nader case for one hundred
pages, he abruptly informs the-reader that the lawsuit was terminated by
settlement. After sixty-six pages of developing the intricacies of the "Grand
Canyon Disaster" and one of the trials in chapter six, he briefly notes that
the defendants' offers of settlement escalated and that most of 128 remaining cases were quickly settled. After thirteen pages of detail on the
McKusker v. Onassis case in chapter 7 he says merely that the case was
settled "[i]n short order" for $800,000. The reader is repeatedly worked
up to an emotional pitch only to be bluntly told that the case was settled.
The author himself admits that termination of the Nader lawsuit was
"undramatic," and that the lawsuit ended like ninety percent of all American
lawsuits." This must have an effect upon the lay-reader like reading a
detective story in which the detective relentlessly pursues the suspect nearly
to the point of cracking the case, only to find out that the culprit pays the
detective's client a large sum of money to stop the probe. Yet, about this
highly important feature of the tort compensation system, the author is
almost entirely mum. He offers the reason for his silence in the Nader case:
Settlement negotiations are conducted in confidence, and most lawyers
-myself included-believe that they should remain confidential forever, in order to free the negotiators from any inhibitions that might
stall the settlement process. Therefore, I cannot tell you any details
of the negotiations.33

31 See

32

LAwsuIT, supra note 3, at 569-70, 594.

Id. at 112.

334J. at

101,
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He indulges in four breaches of this policy during the course of the book, "
explaining in one instance that the settlement figure was significant in itself
and was divulged with the consent of the client, 5 but apparently he was
unable to resist the well-known tendency of tort lawyers to relate humorous
anecdotes, 6 or sophisticated techniques." Aside from these slips, his apology
is unpersuasive. His policy is understandable, even commendable. But he
could have easily overcome the inhibitions of negotiators by using the
technique of the hypothetical or perhaps even a fictionalized or anonymous
version of a real situation. Revelation of settlement tactics by such a renowned tort specialist would have added significantly to the value of the
book for lay readers and would have provided needed discourse for consideration by law students in many law school courses on negotiation. At
the very least, he could have detached himself from direct discussion of
behind-closed-doors strategy and discussed one of the newest revolutions in
tort practice: the "structured," "periodic payment" or annuity technique
of settlement.3 ' It seems that another aspect of the entrepreneur-lawyer
system is at work to produce the author's silence; in a world of entrepreneurs,
one must expect trade secrets to be jealously guarded. Perhaps we must wait
until the author retires from the active practice to hear his trade secrets in
a book entitled "Settlement." After reading Mr. Speiser's latest work, this
reviewer will regard that day with mixed and conflicting emotions. In
his book and his life, Mr. Speiser has done much to dispel Shakespeare's
Jacques' notion of justice, 9 the fifth age of man, as well as Ambrose Bierce's
definition of lawyer, litigant, litigation, and impunity,"0 against which he
began this Lawsuit.
Id. at 172, 300, 353, 486.
Id. at 486.
86 Id. at 172, 353.
87
Id. at 300.
88 For consideration of the types of settlements mentioned, see Bowen, Annuities and Settlement-Why and How, Chronicle August 1976 at 2; Corboy, Structured Injustice: Compulsory
Periodic Payment of Judgments, 66 A.B.A.J. 1524 (1980); Evans, Structured SettlementsA Useful Tool in Catastrophic Injury Cases, J. Mo. B. October-November 1977 at 419;
Krause, Structured Settlements for Tort Victims, 66 A.B.A.J. 1527 (1980) [the author's
law partner]; Lilly, Alternatives to Lump Sum Payments in Personal Injury Cases, 44 INs.
COUNSEL J. 243 (1977); Sedgwick and Judge The Use of Annuities in Settlement of Personal Injury Cases, 41 INs. COUNSEL J. 584 (1974); Tinsman, What's It Really Worth?
Evaluating Annuities for Settlement Purposes, TRIAL September 1978 at 30; Annuities to
84

85

Settle Cases, 42 INs. COUNSEL J. 367 (1975).
S9 "[AInd then the justice,

In fair round belly with good capon lin'd
With eyes severe and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws and modem instances;
And so he plays his part." Shakespeare, As You Like It,
Act H, Scene VII, Tm WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARI (Black ed. 1937).
40 "LAWYER: One skilled in circumvention of the law.
LITIGANT: A person about to give up his skin for the hope of retaining his bones.
LITIGATION: A machine which you go into as a pig and come out as a sausage.
IMPUNITY: Wealth." LAwsurr, supra note 3, at v., quoting frOn A, BmRcE, THE DEVIL'S
DICTIONARY
(1911).
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